Abstract-We consider a Gaussian cheap talk game with quadratic cost functions. The cost function of the receiver is equal to the estimation error variance, however, the cost function of each senders contains an extra term which is captured by its private information. Following the cheap talk literature, we model this problem as a game with asymmetric information. We start by the single sender case in which the receiver also has access to a noisy but honest side information in addition to the message transmitted by a strategic sender. We generalize this setup to multiple sender case. For the multiple sender case, we observe that if the senders are not herding (i.e., copying each other policies), the quality of the receiver's estimation degrades rapidly as the number of senders increases.
I. INTRODUCTION
Modern control and estimation infrastructures such as power grids, transportation infrastructure, and climate control rely on distributed systems. Distributed systems are typically more robust and efficient when compared to their centralized counterparts, however, designing these systems and interpreting their outcome often proves to be more challenging. A typical (yet often implicit) assumption when designing distributed or networked estimation systems (see [1] - [3] ) is that the measurement units (sensors and their transmitters) 1 are not strategic, i.e., that they directly transmit whatever they measure. In practice, however, this might be an unrealistic assumption for several reasons.
One such reason that has attracted much attention recently, is the issue of security. A malicious sender might intercept the stream of data that is being transmitted from the measurement unit and replace it with misleading information. In this case, as an alternative approach to the current literature on control systems security [4] - [6] , we can think of the malicious sender as a strategic measurement unit that has a preference conflicting to that of the receiver 2 . A more subtle reason for dismissing the above mentioned assumption is the possible presence of actually strategic mea- The authors would like to thank the hospitality of University of California at Berkeley, specifically, Alexandre M. Bayen and his research group, as well as Citris and Caltran, where they spent time when working on this paper. In addition, F. Farokhi would also like to thank Karl H. Johansson for comments and discussions. 1 We call the measurement units senders for short in the rest of the paper. 2 We use the term receiver to denote the estimation unit that gathers all the data and extracts the best estimation of the state of the system. surement units in the distributed system. To better visualize this scenario, let us employ an example stemming from traffic estimation via crowd-sourcing. In this example, we may distribute an application (designed for smart devices) to many users in a city and ask them to voluntarily report the traffic condition where they currently reside 3 . The fused information can then be used to reroute vehicles (through their navigational devices) so as to reduce congestion on some roads. As time passes by, we would inevitably realize that some participants under-report the traffic condition in their neighborhoods (small business owners, for example, might report low traffic in the hope that rerouting would bring them more customers) while some other participants overreport traffic (residential users, for example, might want to repel traffic to reduce noise pollution or improving safety in their neighborhood). A game (such as the strategic signaling problem described above for the crowd-sourcing traffic estimation) in which better informed senders are communicating with a receiver, who ultimately takes a decision regarding the social welfare, is called a cheap talk game. The problem of finding an equilibrium for these games has been studied extensively in Economics literature [7] - [10] .
In this paper, we consider a version of cheap talk games with quadratic cost functions, linear policies, and in the presence of Gaussian random variables. Our interest in this setup is primarily motivated by linear quadratic Gaussian estimation problems in the networked systems literature as well as easier derivations of optimal strategies. The cost function of the receiver is taken to be equal to the estimation error variance (of the state of the system which is assumed to be a Gaussian random variable), however, the cost function of each sender has an extra term which is captured by the private information of that particular sender. First, we study the game in which a single sender is transmitting some information about the state of the system in the presence of a (noisy but honest) side channel to the receiver. We show that in this case indeed an equilibrium exists which also happens to be a linear one 4 . Equipped with this result, we 3 For a similar project, interested readers might want to read more about Waze TM (http://www.waze.com). 4 Notice that studies in cheap talk literature (e.g., see [7] ) assume that the private information (which guarantees that the cost functions of the sender and the receiver do not match each other) is deterministic and uniformly bounded away from zero which is not the case in our problem formulation (because we assume that the private information is Gaussian random variable with zero mean). In addition, in [7] , a more general class of cost functions (namely, Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions) were considered and the probability distribution of state of the system was assumed to have a bounded support set. These distinctions result in equilibria with different properties, that is, at least for the single sender case that we did not a priori restrict our search to linear policies, there exists one equilibrium (see Theorem 2.2) which does not results in quantization. move to the multiple sender case. There, we restrict ourselves to the set of linear policies and symmetric problems (i.e., the private information of the senders are independently and identically distributed random variables). We characterize an equilibrium of the cheap talk game in this setup. The quality of the receiver's estimation for this equilibrium degrades rapidly as the number of senders increases. Finally, we consider the case in which the senders are herding 5 (i.e., they copy each others' policies) and we characterize another equilibrium. Interestingly, for this equilibrium, the quality of the receiver's estimation improves very fast with increasing the number of senders. This observation illustrate the fact that herding between strategic senders (including malicious ones) is indeed a virtue (for the receiver).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, we consider the single sender cheap talk game in Section II. In Section III, we generalize the setup to multiple sender case. We focus on the cheap talk game in which the senders are herding in Section IV. Numerical results are presented in Section V. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section VI.
A. Notation
Let R, N, and Z denote the sets of real, natural, and integer numbers, respectively. We use the notation N = {n ∈ N | n ≤ N }. Furthermore, let S n + and S n ++ denote the set of semi-positive definite and positive definite matrices in R n×n . For any A ∈ R n×n , we use the notation A ≥ 0 and A > 0 to denote A ∈ S n + and A ∈ S n ++ , respectively. For any two random variables x and y, we use the notation V xy = E{xy }. Finally, x 2 denotes the 2-norm of vector x ∈ R n for any n ∈ N. Through out the paper, we also use the game theoretic convention x = (x i , x −i ) in which x i and x −i denote i-th element of vector x and the rest of its elements, respectively.
II. SINGLE SENDER WITH SIDE INFORMATION
In this section, we consider the communication structure pictured in Figure 1 . The receiver (denoted by R in Figure 1 ) wants to estimate a random variable x ∈ R nx (throughout this paper, we use the notationx(·) to denote this estimation as a function of the information available to the receiver). The sender (denoted by S in Figure 1 ) transmits a signal z ∈ R nz (that may or may not contain some information about x). We assume that the sender has access to a perfect measurement of x. In addition to the message initiated by the sender, the receiver also has access to a side channel that provides the measurement y ∈ R ny . The timing of the game is as follows. First, the measurement y is revealed. Then, sender S announces z. Finally, the receiver R computes the optimal estimate by solving
where Υ denotes the set of all Lebesgue-measurable functions from R ny × R nz to R nx . The goal of the sender is to minimize the following cost function E{ (x + θ) − x(y, γ(x, y, θ)) 2 2 }, with respect to γ ∈ Γ in which θ ∈ R nx is the private information of the sender (i.e., it is only available to the sender S) and Γ denotes the set of all Lebesgue-measurable functions from
Throughout the rest of this section, we assume that x, y, θ are jointly distributed Gaussian random variables with zero mean and known (finite) covariance matrix
We likewise denote the covariance matrix of z and y, z and x, z and θ with V zy , V zx , and V zθ , respectively (note that we make no assumption about the law of z at this stage, however). In this section, we assume that the covariance matrix in (2) is invertible. Now, we are ready to present the strategy of the sender and the receiver at the equilibrium. THEOREM 2.2: There exists an equilibrium where both functionsx * and γ * are affine. More precisely, the receiver uses the Least Mean Square (LMS) estimator
while the sender uses the strategy z = γ * (x, y, θ) = α 1 x + α 2 θ + α 3 y + v where
and v ∈ R nz is a Gaussian distributed random variable with zero mean and covariance matrix
in which V zx , V zθ , V zy are determined by solving optimization problem
where W and Q are defined in equation (7). Proof: When the sender uses an affine strategy of the form mentioned in the statement of the theorem, the receiver's best response is the LMS estimator [12, p. 80] . We thus only need to show that, provided the receiver useŝ x * (·) in (3), the sender's optimal policy is indeed linear, and satisfies (4)- (6) . Note that, once the receiver's strategy is fixed as above, the sender's cost can be written solely as a function of V zx , V zy , and V zθ regardless of the distribution of z. Indeed, we can write (8) . In the rest of the proof, without loss of generality 6 , we assume that
yy V yz = I, which results in
By substituting this identity into (8), we can observe that
yy V yθ ) is a constant term (more precisely, it does not depend on the sender's strategy). Noting that dim(θ) = dim(x) and because of the fact that trace(AB) = trace(BA) for matrices A, B of appropriate dimensions (see Item 8, Section 4.1.1 in [13, p. 41]), we can rearrange the terms in the estimation error as 6 This is without loss of generality because the optimization problem after scaling z is feasible if and only if it is feasible after scaling z.
where W is defined in (7a). Since the covariance matrix of the vector of random variables [x θ y z ] is a positive semi-definite matrix, it should satisfy
Note that V zz = V zy V −1 yy V yz + I > 0. Therefore, we can use the Schur complement (see [14, p. 651] ) to show that the above mentioned condition is equivalent to
Now, we can easily prove the identity in (9) in which
Therefore, the sender's best response can be extracted from solving the optimization problem in (6) . Now, we just need to show that there exists an affine policy for the sender that results in covariance matrices V zx , V zθ , V zy . Let z = α 1 x + α 2 θ + α 3 y + v where v ∈ R nz is a Gaussian distributed random variable. In this case, we can calculate
which results in (4) and (5a). Moreover, (5b) follows from substituting (4) and (5a) into V zz − V zy V −1 yy V yz = I. Note that when the sender's message is scalar; i.e., n z = 1, one might be able to extract an explicit solution for (6) upon using Rayleigh-Ritz theorem [13, p. 67]. 
III. MULTIPLE SENDERS

A. Basic framework
In this section, we assume that the senders and the receiver are connected to each other using the communication network presented in Figure 2 . For each i ∈ N , sender S i transmits the message y i ∈ R ny i to the receiver R. All these signals are transmitted at exactly the same time through parallel secure communication channels to the receiver (see Figure 2 ) and, hence, the senders do not have access to each other messages and cannot use this information for constructing their signals. Note that the parameters of the policies of the other senders may be available but the signal realization itself is off limit. Again, as in the last section, each sender S i has access to the exact measurement of the state x ∈ R nx (which the receiver wants to extract) and its private parameter θ i ∈ R nx . Note that x and θ i , i ∈ N , belong to the same space. We also assume that x and θ i , i ∈ N , are jointly distributed Gaussian random variables with zero mean.
Motivated by the results of the previous section, which showed that affine equilibria exist in the two player case, we now restrict ourselves to affine sender policies for the multiplayer case as well. More precisely, we assume that sender i's policy γ i is of the form
nx are deterministic values and v i ∈ R ny i is a zero mean Gaussian random variable. The set of all such policies is denoted by Γ i . In these policies, without loss of generality, we can assume that for any i ∈ N , v i is statistically independent 7 of x and θ i (see [16] for a detailed discussion).
Each γ i ∈ Γ i can be equivalently represented using the tuple (a i , b i , V vivi ) and, therefore, the set of feasible policies Γ i is isomorphic to the product space R nx × R nx × S nx + . Taking advantage of this bijection, we will sometimes abuse notation and refer to this tuple directly as γ i .
Following the transmission of messages y = (y i ) i∈ N , the receiver computes E{x | y 1 , . . . , y N } so as to minimize E{ x−x 2 2 } over the set of random variables x measurable with respect to y 1 , . . . , y N .
Similar to the problem formulation of the last section, the ultimate goal of each sender S i , i ∈ N , is to make surê x(y) is a good estimation of x plus its private information θ i . Therefore, the cost function that sender i, i ∈ N , is trying to minimize is
where, by definition, y j = γ j (x, θ j ) for all j ∈ N . This naturally leads us to the following. DEFINITION 3.1: (EQUILIBRIUM IN AFFINE STRATE-GIES): Let Υ denote the set of all Lebesgue-measurable functions from Π i∈ N R ny i to R nx . A tuple (x * ,(γ * i ) i∈ N ) ∈ Υ × i∈ N Γ i constitutes an equilibrium in affine strate-gies if
Note that the qualifier "in affine strategies" in the definition above has several meanings, all of which are relevant. First, it means that all policies, includingx * are affine (indeed, since all random variables are assumed Gaussian and senders are restricted to affine strategies, the receiver's best response is linear). Second, it also means that the equilibrium in question is a best response only when the senders' strategy space is the set of all affine policies Γ i .
B. Symmetric Equilibria
We are interested in situations where the senders population is large and homogenous, at least as perceived by the receiver. In this case, it is natural to model the private parameters θ i , i ∈ N , as i.i.d random variables. Keeping in mind that we assumed them to be Gaussian with zero mean, their distribution is fully characterized by their covariance matrices V xθi = V xθ for all i. Furthermore, V θiθj = V θθ if i = j and V θiθj = U θθ , otherwise.
In this homogenous context, the receiver should expect all senders to use the same policy, and the best characterization of the population's behavior is thus provided by symmetric equilibria. In the remainder of this paper, we show that such a symmetic equilibrium in affine strategies exists. To do so, we first need to prove the following lemma. LEMMA 3.2:
Proof: See [16] . We are now in a position to prove the main result of this paper regarding the existence of symmetric equilibria in affine strategies. In order to simplify our proofs and derive explicit expressions, we will henceforth assume that dim(y i ) = 1 for all i ∈ N , i.e., that all senders use scalar messages. Similar results can be obtained in the general case, although a different proof is needed. THEOREM 3.3: Assume that n yi = 1 for all i ∈ N , V xθ = 0, and U θθ = 0. There exists a symmetric equilibrium in affine strategies where the receiver followsx * (y) = E{x|(y 1 + · · · + y N )/N } and for all i ∈ N , sender S i employs the linear policy γ * = (a * , b * , 0) where
and ξ = ξ 1 ξ 2 is the normalized eigenvector (i.e., ξ 2 = 1) corresponding to the smallest eigenvalue of the matrix
Furthermore, the senders' policy of the form kγ * , for some k ∈ R, along side the receiver's policyx * also constitutes a symmetric equilibrium in affine strategies.
Proof: See [16] . Because for the presented equilibrium in Theorem 3.3, ξ 1 is independent of N , the quality of estimation in the receiver degrades with increasing N . This is indeed the case since each sender puts more emphasis on its private information rather than the state of the system as N grows each (due to a i and b i being decreasing and increasing functions of N , respectively).
IV. WHAT HAPPENS WHEN SENDERS HERD?
In this section, by herding of the agents, we mean that the senders are imitating each others' policies. The next proposition sheds some light on the nature of the equilibrium when the senders are herding.
Notice that a herding equilibrium does not constitute an equilibrium in the sense of Definition 3.1 since one of the senders might benefit from breaking away from the herd; i.e., by not employing the same strategy as the other senders.
Proof: See [16] . Proposition 4.2 shows that when the senders herd, we can replace them with a single sender with private information (θ 1 + · · · + θ N )/N . Now, because of the Law of Large Numbers, one might expect that the agents' contributions cancel each other and, eventually, that the receiver may have access to the perfect estimation (as N grows larger) because the cost functions of the receiver and this dummy sender matches each other. THEOREM 4.3: Assume that n yi = 1 for all i ∈ N , V xθ = 0, and U θθ = 0. There exists a herding equilibrium in affine strategies where the receiver followsx * (y) = E{x|(y 1 + · · · + y N )/N } and sender S i , i ∈ N , employs a linear policy γ * = (a * , b * , 0) where
where ζ is the normalized eigenvector (i.e., ζ 2 = 1) corresponding to the smallest eigenvalue of the matrix
Furthermore, the senders' policy of the form kγ * , for some k ∈ R, along side the receiver's policyx * also constitutes a herding equilibrium in affine strategies.
Proof: See [16] .
V. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
Here, we employ a simple numerical example to demonstrate the properties of the equilibrium in different scenarios. For simplicity of the presentation and the calculations leading to it, let us fix n x = 1 and n yi = 1 for all i ∈ N . Furthermore, assume that V xθ = 0, V θθ = 1, and V xx = 1.
• Independent Senders: Following Theorem 3.3, we can calculate the senders' signal y i = a * x + b * θ i in which
We also know thatx(y) = E{x|(y 1 + · · · + y N /N )}, which allows us to calculate the estimation error as a function of the number of sender as
, which clearly shows that as N grows larger the quality of the estimation degrades.
• Herding Senders: Following Theorem 4.3, we can calculate the senders' signal y i = a
.
Furthermore, we can calculate the estimation error in the receiver as e 2 (N ) = 2/(N 2 + N ( (N (N + 4) + 2) + 2). In this case, it is evident that the quality of the estimation improves as the number of senders grows which demonstrates why herding between strategic senders is a virtue.
• Nonstrategic Senders: Now, let us consider a rival scenario in which the sensors are not strategic, however, they do not also have access to the exact measurements. Therefore, they transmit y i = x + u i where (u i ) i∈ N are identically and independently distributed Gaussian random variables so that E{u i } = 0 and E{u 2 i } = σ for all i ∈ N (which is without loss of generality as we can always achieve such behavior with an appropriate change of variable). We also assume that E{u i x} = 0 for all i ∈ N . Let us use the notation y = (y i ) i∈ N . The estimation error is e 3 (N ) = σ/(σ + N ). Figure 3 illustrates the estimation error variances e 1 (N ), e 2 (N ), and e 3 (N ) as a function of the number of senders N to visually compare the estimation error of different scenarios with each other as a function of N . Here, we have set σ = 0.3820 so that all the schemes have equal error at N = 1. Interestingly, the estimation error vanishes faster when using high-quality strategic agents that are herding in comparison to non-strategic low-quality ones.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we presented a cheap talk game with quadratic cost functions, and Gaussian state and private information. We first calculated an equilibrium for the single sender case in the presence of honest but noisy side channel information. Then, we studied a symmetric multi-sender cheap talk game both when (i) the agents are independently thinking and when (ii) they herd (i.e., they imitate each others' policies). An interesting insight was that when the agents are herding, the receiver can indeed estimate the state of the system with a large number of sender which does not seem to be possible for the case where the senders are independent. Future work can focus on extending these results to dynamic estimation problems.
